Abstract-Incorrect implementations of network protocol message specifications affect the stability, security, and cost of network system development. Most implementation defects fall into one of three categories of well defined message constraints. However, the general process of constructing network protocol stacks and systems does not capture these categorical constraints. We introduce a systems programming language with new abstractions that capture these constraints. Safe and efficient implementations of standard message handling operations are synthesized by our compiler, and whole-program analysis is used to ensure constraints are never violated. We present language examples using the OpenFlow protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The message handling layer of any network protocol is notoriously difficult to implement correctly. Common errors include: accepting or allowing the creation of malformed messages, using incorrect byte ordering or byte alignment, using undefined values, etc. ( § II). These defects lead to problems in stability, security, performance, and cost for network systems. Table I , the result of a survey of the US-CERT Vulnerability Database [7] , demonstrates that sophisticated organizations implementing mature protocols commit these errors. The persistent introduction of these defects is not the sign of an engineering problem, but a failure to use the correct levels of abstraction when working with network protocols.
Message handling has been the focus of several research efforts. When the wire-format of the message is not important, serialization solutions can be used [15] , [6] . However, with network protocols, because of interoperability requirements, adherence to the specific wire-format is necessary. As a result, a series of Domain Specific Languages (DSLs) that allow programmer control over the wire-format have been designed. These approaches synthesize data structures to hold messages and the typical operations necessary to manipulate them using correct by construction techniques [10] , [2] , [12] . Language researchers have improved upon these DSLs with rich type systems that can prove certain safety properties, and address some of the problems mentioned previously [4] , [5] . Other work developed static analysis techniques, that require no domain knowledge, to survey existing code bases and find occurrences of some of the previously mentioned defects [3] .
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978-1-4799-1270-4/13/$31.00 c 2013 IEEE Systematically eliminating the categories of message related defects requires rich type systems and whole program analysis, which is not supported by existing declarative DSLs. Invariants and semantic information produced by the DSL is not incorporated or used in program analysis by the target language. Furthermore, finding all occurrences of message related defects require some level of domain knowledge during static analysis. This must either be built in to the language or programmer specified in a way that resembles existing network protocol specifications. Analysis by formal methods should be a by-product of compiling the network program, and not require any specialized knowledge by the programmer. Our work-in-progress develops a systems programming language to address these issues. This allows for full program analysis, providing stronger safety guarantees and offering domain specific optimization that is exceedingly difficult to accomplish by hand or impossible with a DSL.
In this paper we clearly identify categories of message related vulnerabilities by their structural and semantic constraints. We show that these categories are responsible for known vulnerabilities, and using our tools we show that even some live Internet traffic violates these constraints. We then introduce a systems programming language that allows programmers to capture network protocol message structure and constraints. The constraints allow the compiler to reason over entire programs, identifying and eliminating the categories of vulnerabilities mentioned before. Additionally, the choice of a systems programming language allows for efficient code generation. Throughout the paper we use OpenFlow [11] as our reference protocol. Our contributions are:
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• the design of a systems programming language that eliminates unsafe protocol implementations through type checking (in § III, § IV, and § V), and • the implementation of a compiler and library supporting the language (in § VI).
II. MESSAGE VULNERABILITIES
There are three categories of message vulnerabilities that we address: structural constraint violation, semantic constraint violation, and unsafe access of conditional fields. In this section we describe these categories in detail with examples using the OpenFlow v1.0 protocol [11] . We first briefly describe the protocol and then show vulnerability examples. Figure 1 summarizes the message format, or representation, of an OpenFlow message. A message consists of a fixed 8 byte header followed by a variable sized payload. The header indicates the version of the OpenFlow protocol, the type of the payload, the length of the entire message, and a transaction identifier used to match response messages to their requests. The payload can be one of 22 types in version 1.0. This protocol was designed to operate over stream-oriented transports, which are more difficult to handle than datagram or message oriented transports. Streams have no concept of message boundaries and can give the program anything from a single byte to several messages in a single read. It is the programmer's responsibility, not the transport's, to determine where the payload ends and the next message begins.
Semantic constraints ensure that a message field's value has a defined meaning in the protocol. For instance, in OpenFlow 1.0 the domain of the version field is [1, 1] . Any value that is not in the domain of its field is semantically invalid; it has no meaning in the protocol definition. Violating a semantic constraint is similar to using undefined behavior in a programming language. As Table I shows, constraint violations lead to vulnerabilities.
Structural constraints address how messages are constructed and used by a program. Messages are constructed in two ways: either by a program to send over a network, or from the network to send to the program. In both cases it is important to construct only structurally valid messages.
These constraints deal with the number of bytes a message occupies in buffers used to communicate with the network. Structural constraint testing is the process of ensuring there are enough bytes to complete the operation of constructing a message from a buffer, or filling a buffer with a well-formed message. For example, any buffer containing less than 8 bytes cannot possibly represent a valid OpenFlow message and any attempt to interpret that buffer as a message, would be an error.
Semantic constraint violations can lead to structural constraint violations. Reading from a stream can produce a buffer containing several messages. The header of the first message must be contained in the first 8 bytes, and the payload must end at the position where the header's length field indicates. In the header, the length field can be semantically invalid, but because it is used to constrain the payload's size, it becomes a structural constraint violation as well. A similar problem arises with a semantically invalid type field that is used to choose the payload.
Safe access ensures that fields with run-time dependency are always validated before use. Many fields in OpenFlow are dependent; their meaning is determined by the values of previously encountered fields. For example, there is a dependency between the payload of a message and the header's type field. A structurally and semantically valid Hello message cannot have its payload treated as the FlowMod type without invoking undesired behavior.
III. LANGUAGE
This work builds on fundamental notions from system programming [8] , [14] , from structured generic programming, and mathematical programming languages such as AXIOM [9] , and Liz [13] . This work, heavily inspired by the Liz language, aims to support simple, safe, and efficient handling of network protocol messages. The core of our language supports values, references, constants, functions, records, a minimal set of expressions, and follows Call-By-Value semantics. We do not expose pointers to the users of the language and drastically restrict heap allocation to certain language built-in types. Figure 2 shows the abstract syntax of the language. The dependent types ω, are a primary contribution of this paper.
Our language captures the structural and semantic constraints of a message with user-defined type and variable declarations. We then enforce these constraints through the process of object and symbolic construction. If object construction completes successfully, then structural constraints are upheld, if symbolic construction completes successfully, then semantic constraints hold. Using construction to establish invariants is a common way to reason about program behavior.
An object, or instance of a type, must be constructed before use. The process of object construction involves allocating space where the object will live, and initializing its values to establish its invariant. Symbolic construction extends object construction to include ensuring the value of the object is consistent with its symbolic constructor. Upon completion of construction, an object is well-formed and its invariant has been established.
The ω types, see Figure 2 , allow user definition of precise structural and semantic constraints. Structural constraints can be explicitly stated by the specifiers: bits(e), and constraint(e). Structural constraints are otherwise implicit in the type, which will be explained below. Semantic con- straints are introduced through the declaration syntax. Any declaration can impose a semantic constraint through the use of the bar, |, followed by a guard expression. These declarations provide constraint information to the compiler that is used in full program analysis. This allows the compiler to reason about both constraint satisfaction and safe usage.
The following is a short summary of the ω types:
• uint(spec[, xform]) defines an unsigned integer that has a precise bit width specified by its structural constraint (spec). Optionally, the type also takes a transform parameter (xform) that allows for non-native representation of the data. For instance, a protocol may specify that a value's representation is Most Significant Byte First (MSBF) and 1's complement.
• array(τ, e) and vector(τ) types allow for sequences of objects of type τ. The array is statically sized to contain e elements, while the vector has a dynamic size.
• record{decl} is a sequence of declarations, whose objects can be accessed by field name. There is no padding, alignment, or meta-data applied to the object by the compiler. If padding, alignment, or meta-data is desired, the programmer can explicitly declare them as fields. Additionally, the order of fields is preserved.
• variant{τ if e} is a union of types where each type is guarded by a predicate. A variant is constructed by evaluating the predicate set and invoking the constructor of the corresponding true predicate. A variant is uninitialized until evaluation of the predicate set. Figure 3 demonstrates how to declare types corresponding to the OpenFlow header, payload, and message. The header is a simple record of four fields, all of which have constant specifiers, and follow MSBF ordering. The payload type is a unique choice of types based on a type parameter. For the values in the header to have semantic meaning in version 1.0 of the OpenFlow protocol we have to constrain their values. This is achieved with the semantic constraint valid_hdr, which must first be defined as a function that takes a constant reference to a header and returns bool. Message is defined as a record including a header with version 1.0 semantic constraints, and a payload that is parameterized over the header's type field and constraint. All type constructors, with the exception of uint and array allow for an optional specifier constraint. In this particular case, construction of Pld is not to exceed the result of the constraint hdr.len − bytes(hdr).
Buffer & View are abstractions over the underlying machine architecture that help the compiler ensure structural constraints are never violated. Reading from a file or socket results in a buffer with begin and end boundaries surrounding the bytes received. View is a mechanism that restricts visibility into a Buffer. The set of operations defined for Buffer and View are:
• view: returns a view of an entire buffer Figure 4 illustrates a buffer returned from a read system call against a TCP socket. A single read has resulted in more than one protocol message. The initial view wraps all of the data; however, the first few bytes of the view contain a protocol header, which provides the length of the first message. This length is then used to constrain the visibility to precisely one message. The constrain operation supports use of datagram and stream oriented transports, while also providing safety boundaries for object construction.
IV. COMPILER SYNTHESIS
Programmers continue to make mistakes implementing message operations that are necessary in all protocols such as those mentioned in § I and § VI. Our strategy is to eliminate the need to write these common operations by having the compiler synthesize safe and efficient versions. All user-defined type definitions contain structural and semantic constraints. This information is sufficient to synthesize the following operations:
• construction: constructs an object from expressions • copy_construction: constructs an object from another • assignment: copies an object's state into another • bytes: returns the number of bytes of an object • to_view: writes an object to a view • from_view: constructs an object from a view • equal, not_equal: compare objects for equivalence • to_string: returns a string representation of the object The remainder of this section will describe the synthesis process for a small subset of the above operations focusing on synthesis and constraint validation for bytes and from_view.
Bytes is the name of the operation for determining the byte size of any object. The operation bytes is synthesized for each declared ω type in a program. For uint it returns the number of bytes indicated by the specifier. For array it returns the result of sizeof(T ) * elements, where T is the type contained by the array. For objects of type Vector, bytes is not a constant expression. It has run-time dependencies and returns the accumulation of calling bytes over its elements. Record returns the sum of calling bytes over its constituent fields, and is only a constant if all of its fields are also constant. Calling bytes over a variant returns 0 if the variant is uninitialized, or it proxies the call to the contained object. Figure 5 illustrates the process just described in pseudo code. Several other synthesized operations depend on bytes.
Structural constraint violations must be prevented during object construction. There are only three ways to violate a structural constraint: overflowing a view, underflowing a view, or constructing an invalid variant. Overflowing a view involves advancing the view beyond the number of bytes contained. Underflowing a view involves constraining a view by more bytes than contained. Constructing an invalid variant is caused when none of the variant's contained type predicates evaluate to true.
In order to construct the OpenFlow header the size of the view must be at least as large as the number of bytes of the header, or 8 bytes. During object construction the view is always advanced by the size in bytes of the object. Constructing the message object from a view of 7 or less bytes would result in a view overflow.
The OpenFlow protocol indicates the length of a message with the header length field. This value is used to constrain the view for payload construction. It is possible, through accident or malicious intent, for the length field to be inconsistent with The value used to construct the variant payload is in the header. Again, either through accident or malicious intent, it is possible for the header to indicate a type which will not result in valid variant construction. Using a variant in an invalid way will result in undefined behavior.
Object construction is possible with either a constructor that operates over expressions or using the from_view operation. Figure 6 illustrates pseudo code for synthesizing from_view. The operation returns false when a structural constraint has been violated. Failure indicates a partially constructed object. For simple types, such as uint and array, the structural constraints are always checked. If there are not enough bytes in the view to complete the operation, the operation fails. Otherwise, the object's value is constructed by reading from the view. If a xform is present the object's value is updated using the specified transform. Finally, the view is advanced by the size of the object just constructed.
The vector version of from_view operates in a greedy fashion, it will consume the entire view. If this behavior is not desired the view must be constrained before construction. As long as there are bytes in the view the vector will attempt to construct an object. Upon success, the object is inserted into the vector and the process repeats. The record version will attempt to construct its constituent fields and either return at the first failure or succeed. The variant must guard against the third type of structural constraint; it must be initialized to a valid type. If this is not true then from_view will fail, otherwise from_view is called over the appropriate type.
Symbolic construction ensures that all run-time type dependencies must be propagated and semantic constraints are inserted into synthesized code. The OpenFlow message from Figure 3 has semantic constraints, a run-time type dependency, and a constrained view. The semantic constraint turns into a predicate check immediately after the call to from_view of If the check fails, the operation immediately returns with failure. Next, the type parameter must be checked and initialized before the call to from_view over the payload. The check ensures that failure happens if the value is undefined, and if upon success initializes the payload's kind. Finally, the constrained view operation is propagated. The result of this final step is shown in Figure 7 .
V. SAFETY AND OPTIMIZATION
There are only three ways to violate structural constraints: view underflow, view overflow, and reading or writing from an uninitialized variant. These three categories of mistakes can be identified with two simple invariants. If the bytes of a view are always non-negative then it is impossible to underflow or overflow the view. If a read or write of a variant is always preceded by a valid initialization then the third category is also impossible. The compiler uses a dataflow analysis framework to prove that these invariants always hold or fail the compilation of the program with useful error messages.
The goal of the compiler is to synthesize safe and efficient code. The synthesis algorithm described previously will produce safe but inefficient code. The operations to_view and from_view contain fine-grained guards that protect against view underflow and overflow. These fine-grained guards are the source of inefficiency. For example, it is better to have a single guard over a sequence of objects of constant size, then to have a guard over each object. We call this guard fusing, it is analogous to fusing basic blocks to form larger basic blocks. It is also useful to lift guards from inside the called function to the call site. By lifting guards to the call site, potential guard fusing optimization becomes possible. The optimization strategy that we follow is a set of fusing and lifting rounds that reduce the number of guards and form the largest possible object construction basic blocks for to_view and from_view.
All synthesized operations have a similar Call Sequence Graph (CSG). Figure 8 illustrates the generalized CSG for a Flow Modification message. Each node represents a function in the call sequence, the function types are indicated by the node shape in the figure. This CSG is used to both synthesize operation definitions and analyze safe usage of messages. Guards start at the leaves of the graph and are lifted to their parent nodes. If all guards can be fused within an interior node, then the new guard is lifted and the process is repeated. This process ensures guards covering the largest possible constant sized objects are performed, additionally this process is unaware of protocols and will optimize across layer boundaries. Sometimes a node can have more than one parent node, where the parents have differing behaviors. In this case, we split the node into two versions where we lift the guard when it is contained within a constant structure, or leave it in place otherwise. Code generation takes place after the optimization phase. We currently support C++11 as our target language. All message related type definitions and synthesized operations will be written to a single set of .cpp and .hpp files, the program itself is written to main.cpp.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Protocol implementations that send messages that are either structurally or semantically invalid exist. Applying this work we were able to discover structural constraint violations in packet traces from core Internet routers. Furthermore, we were able to define three categories of message constraints, and show violation of these constraints can lead to high profile vulnerabilities. Network programs must always handle messages in a safe manner. To this aim, we developed a systems programming language and library for writing safe efficient network programs.
The language implementation was originally developed as a C++11 library. The library was used to test ideas and guide the language design. However, in order to enforce safety guarantees with optimization a compiler was necessary. We experimented with the language using two types of network programs: a protocol analyzer, and an OpenFlow stack. This set of applications provided good coverage over the diversity of protocol formats and their constraints.
Core Internet traces were obtained from Caida [1] as test data for packet analyzers written in our new language facilities. The traffic was recorded from high speed interfaces, OC-192 (up to 10Gbps). Only the Layer 3 and Layer 4 headers, timing, and summary information are present. The layer 3 addresses were randomized and the layer 4 payloads were removed for anonymization purposes. Each trace has between 500 MB and 1 GB of data and was timestamped in minute intervals. We analyzed a 10 minute segment of traces from October of 2012.
We focused on looking for structural and value constraints violations within IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP. Table II shows that we found structural constraint violations in all but one protocol; no semantic constraint violations were found. IPv4 violated its structural constraint with regards to IPv4 Options. The values in the Internet Header Length (IHL) field indicated a number of Options that should be constructed; however, this packet would overflow its view, the received block of data was too small. The TCP and UDP structural constraint violations were of the same nature; they violated the basic constraint of a minimum sized header. The source of these structural constraint violations is not currently known. It could be evidence of unintentional errors in sending devices, it could be maliciously crafted packets, or it could be due to the collection process of the trace data. However, regardless of the source, structural constraints have been violated and these packets should not be admitted to safe network programs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Incorrect implementations of protocol message specifications affect the stability of network systems and potentially lead to vulnerabilities. In this paper we identified three categories of constraints that can be used either to test whether a message is well-formed or to generate safe code. We developed a systems programming language that allowed user-defined types to capture these constraints as well as a reasoning framework to ensure these constraints are always upheld within the users program. We presented example type definitions and compiler synthesized code using the OpenFlow 1.0 protocol.
The next steps for this work fall into two categories: extending the ω types and formalizing the meta-system. Extending the type system will allow for the support of more protocols. Vectors will be extended to support termination predicates as a structural constraint parameter, this will allow for self-terminating sequences such as null-terminated character strings. Generalized enumerations will be added as an easier mechanism for restricting values used in message construction. Finally, work on the meta-system is focused on generating proof certificates that can be used for mechanical verification of safety.
